

## REVIEW ESSAY

# Towards a European Security and Defence Policy

RALPH DIETL

Gülnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Co-operation, 1945–1991* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 232 pp., ISBN 0 333 94939 0.

Stuart Croft and others, *Britain and Defence 1945–2000. A Policy Re-evaluation* (Essex: Pearson, 2001), 158 pp., ISBN 0582 30377X.

Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, ppb. 1999), 256 pp., ISBN 0 333 77477 9.

Beatrice Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 277 pp., ISBN 0 333 69389 2.

Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?* Chaillot Paper 43 (Paris, Western European Union, November 2000), 114 pp., ISBN 1017 7566.

Michael Quinlan, *European Defense Co-operation. Asset or Threat to NATO?* (Baltimore, MD, 2001), 90 pp., ISBN 1 930365 04 7.

Global as well as European security have been shaken by the events of 11 September 2001. Analysts now focus on the new threat to European and global security and its impact on the existing security regime in the West.<sup>1</sup> It would be wrong to assume that a single event, such as the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, could change

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the entire security architecture of the West. Even the fall of the Berlin Wall did not lead to an abrupt change in security structures. An analysis of the genesis of Europe's security architecture will reveal how stable the general patterns in Western security are. Even the development towards a European Security and Defence Identity and European Security and Defence Policy so prevalent since the Blair–Chirac talks in St. Malo in 1998 follows traditional patterns of international behaviour.<sup>2</sup> The main question to be answered is whether the focus on global policing will enhance or destroy the emerging European defence architecture. Only a thorough examination of the history of European Security Cooperation will allow a first evaluation of the impact of the events of 'nine/11' on European security.

Insight into the subject of European Security is provided by an ever increasing output of publications. Whole libraries can be filled with analyses on aspects of European Security. The review focuses on six publications on European security published in the years 1997 to 2001. Although the volumes have entirely different approaches, and the publications cover different time spans, the works have one thing in common, they reflect on the 'European' contribution to Western Security. The authors analyze the underlying currents that shape the security architecture in Europe. While the works of Beatrice Heuser focus on the influence of military nuclear power on European cooperation, Gülnur Aybet analysis the emergence of the current European Security regime. The works of Jolyon Howorth and Sir Michael Quinlan do stress the 'revolution of 1998', the re-introduction of defence into the European integration process itself. The British contribution deserves separate attention for Franco-British cooperation has always been the backbone of European security cooperation. One could go as far as maintaining that there is no meaningful European security cooperation without British participation. This is taken into account by including here *Britain and Defence*, published by Stuart Croft and others.

A regime-theoretical basis characterizes Gülnur Aybet's *The Dynamics of European Security Co-operation, 1945–1991*. The monograph, generally taking a far more theoretical approach, aims at explaining the dynamics of integration in the field of European security cooperation (p.1). According to the author, European security cooperation was a product of two external factors – 'the superpower squeeze' and the Soviet threat – and evolved 'either as a means to demonstrate Western resolve against the Soviet threat or to

provide Western Europe with an independent voice between the superpowers' (p.2). The aim of the book is to show how the security regime of the Cold War survived without the external factors that shaped it, and to analyze the challenges this regime faces in the post-Cold War era (p.8). After a brief introduction into theories of integration – federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism, and regime theory – which explains the maintenance of security structures 'in the absence of power as a regulating factor' (p.26), the author focuses on a historical account of post-war European security cooperation. Aybet correctly emphasizes that postwar planning included the concept of a federation of Europe. The division of Europe into two blocs, however, put an end to the all-European plans of the federalists to create a European 'Third Force'. And yet the notion of a 'Third Force' survived, although limited to Western Europe. It peaked in the creation of the Western Union in 1948 (in 1954 re-christened Western European Union, WEU). The author argues, however, that European security cooperation did not emerge from a blueprint, but as a result of external side-effects (p.68). The only conscious attempt to create a European army, the European Defence Community (EDC) project of 1952–54, was a spill-over from the successful European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (p.77). According to Aybet, a multitude of external and internal dynamics led to the demise of the EDC project, and to a deliberate exemption of European security from the European integration process encapsulated in the European Communities (EC, p.82). Thereafter, European integration was limited to the economic sphere. All defence cooperation, including the nuclear cooperation that emerged during the 1950s, was pursued outside the European integration process. The search of the Europeans for a European dimension in the Atlantic Alliance took centre-stage with the efforts of de Gaulle to create a 'Third Force' through allocating defence responsibilities to the European Economic Community (EEC). De Gaulle sought to extend the scope of the community to include foreign policy and defence. In contrast to the federalists, de Gaulle aimed at an extension of competencies, but not a strengthened institution. This policy emerged, as Aybet correctly highlights, after de Gaulle had given up the attempt to reform the Atlantic Alliance from within. The European construction was meant to pressurize the US to reform the Alliance structures and 'distance Britain as a potential rival for leadership by duplicating the WEU and excluding Britain from the EC' (p.102).

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Aybet argues that ideas to create a European deterrent based on the British and French independent nuclear potentials emerged in the 1960s. A European Nuclear Force serving a European Federation was considered as a possible first step towards the formation of a European Political Union (p.119). Those plans were nothing but side-effects of issues like nuclear and burden sharing discussed within NATO (p.198). Only the revival of the WEU by Harmel in 1968 was due to an internal dynamic: namely to circumvent a French veto on Britain's membership in the EEC (p.119). Internal dynamics were responsible as well for the European Political Community process launched by the Davignon report of 1970. Yet according to the author, a spill-over to security and defence did not occur (p.130). The European security cooperation of the 1980, the recreation of Franco-German Security Cooperation and the revival of the WEU were nothing but reactions to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations, which threatened a decoupling of American and European security and a denuclearization of Europe. Other external factors, as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) project and the Gulf War, stressed the necessity of European defence cooperation. Europe felt an ever stronger urge to regain a voice in East-West relations, arms control and global security. The WEU Council Meeting of the Hague 'officially established the WEU as a European security forum' (p.156).

Although European security cooperation, according to Aybet, was 'entirely shaped' by the superpower squeeze and the Soviet threat, the principles and norms governing the Western European cooperation survived the shift from the postwar to the post-Cold War era (p.166). The author convincingly shows that it was the reunification of Germany that boosted European integration. Integration was a means to anchor a reunified Germany into Europe. Monetary Union and negotiations on political union were part of the restructuring of Europe following German reunification. Different models for a security partnership emerged. Britain urged a transatlantic framework centred around NATO, France a Western European one based on the EC, and Germany a pan-European one centred around the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, p.172). However, no revolutionary changes occurred. The 'security community' that had emerged during the Cold War was preserved. The regime survived the erosion of its original *raison d'être*. The author argues that European Security cooperation during the Cold War was almost exclusively driven by

external dynamics (pp.196, 204). The 1990s in contrast led not only to an erosion of the external dynamics but also to the emergence of an internal dynamic as driving forces. External dynamics in the post-Cold War era, however, are likely to be a threat to European security cooperation. A major threat would be a conflict of interests among the European states concerning out-of-area tasks (p.204).

Beatrice Heuser's two volumes on nuclear strategy and nuclear mentality lay out the different attitudes of three key European players, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, to nuclear weapons. *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000* establishes that despite their collocation in the same world region, the three had widely different preferences during and immediately after the end of the Cold War. This is true also about their attitudes towards repeated attempts to create a European Nuclear Force. The volume argues that once America had become vulnerable to Soviet reprisals, its strategy differed fundamentally from that of the European powers. This led not only to the creation of the independent nuclear capabilities of Great Britain and France, but also to the emergence of plans to form a European Nuclear Cooperation. Those tensions arose mainly in the time of détente, when the United States moved away from 'massive retaliation' towards its own version of 'flexible response' (which Heuser terms 'Flexible Response II' or the 'Return to Symmetrical Response', p.13). According to Heuser, it was the paradigm shift of the early 1960s from instant nuclear reprisal to a first stage conventional defence that made the Europeans look for their own defence strategy. Europeans feared that the shift in US strategy signalled that the US would abandon Europe rather than risking nuclear annihilation. Europeans feared even more that the new strategy might open the avenue for a deal among the superpowers, to satisfy the US and Soviet quest for nuclear non-proliferation. A denuclearized European satellite might have been the result (p.19). (A third fear would emerge in the 1980s: namely of excessive US belligerency.) This led to the reemergence of the idea of a European Nuclear Force. According to Heuser, three reactions to US strategy and defence policy in the 1960s can be distinguished: (1) attempts to reform NATO, (2) the development of independent nuclear potentials, and (3) the creation of a European Defence Force (p.24).

France and Germany wanted to 'continue to rely on nuclear weapons to deter all war in Europe'. While France preferred an independent nuclear deterrent, Germany insisted on the deployment

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of inter-regional ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Europe. Great Britain despised the idea of a NATO IRBM Force put forward by the US to meet the anxieties of the Europeans and looked for a doctrinal instead of a hardware solution. An approach that finally found acceptance with the adoption of MC14/3 (Heuser's 'Flexible Response III' or 'Flexible Escalation', p.54) and the creation of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. According to Heuser, European concerns were heeded, and nuclear deterrence remained crucial to NATO defence strategy. Heuser argues that it was mainly Britain's commitment to 'Interdependence' that kept the Americans committed and forestalled the emergence of a European Nuclear Force as reaction to the shift in US defence strategy (p.91). Paris remained distrustful and retained a strategy of deterrence *pure et dure*. The *force de frappe* was built up in order to eventually serve as a detonator, to force the United States to utilize its nuclear arsenal in times of aggression (p.106). Paris, however, refused to submit control of the *force de frappe* to European institutions. Heuser correctly underlines that in the last resort France defeated a European Nuclear Force. This made any wooing of the Germans in defence matters a vain exercise. West Germany – lacking the option to create an independent nuclear force, due to its renunciation of the production of ABC-weapons – feared discrimination. Bonn therefore supported a reform of NATO strategy and institutions, to safeguard Germany a voice in nuclear affairs. Integration was central to German defence planning, as integration guaranteed equality. Bonn focused mainly on the emergence of a NATO Nuclear Force free from a US veto. Having realized that a hardware solution was unattainable, the Federal Republic followed the British example and pleaded for a doctrinal solution, that guaranteed *Vorwärtsverteidigung* (forward defence close to the Inner-German Border) and *Mitbestimmung* (co-decision making, pp.141, 144). Had France granted Germany a status of equality, the Federal Republic might have opted for a 'European' Europe. Anglo-French nuclear cooperation as a *quid pro quo* for British accession to the EEC, however, was rejected by the Federal Republic due to a lack of European construction. Heuser therefore correctly underlines that a European Nuclear Force has to await the *Grand Messe*, the solemn transfer of the French and British nuclear arsenals to a European President. This, however, seems almost unattainable having regard to the jealousies of the European nation states (p.172).

Heuser's *Nuclear Mentalities* complements her *Nuclear Strategies* by trying to explain the culturally rooted reasons for the different

approaches of Britain, France and the FRG to nuclear weapons and deterrence strategies. It takes a unique approach, offering a cultural explanation of security policy. The author convincingly shows that European security is more than strategies and arms procurement. In this extremely well written and researched volume mentality takes centre-stage – the belief systems, of the European nation states, which are shaped by collective experience and geographical peculiarities. The author's central aim is to prove that strategy is a 'function of the political system and culture from which it springs' (p.1). In the three comparative case studies, the author examines the political cultures of Britain, France and (West) Germany and analyzes the patterns that shaped their long term strategic thinking, elucidating the belief system underlying national defence policies. For Heuser, the past dictates strategic thinking. Britain, having lost an empire, desperately sought to cling onto its position as a great power, but soon realized that it was bound to rely on the European continent or the United States to influence global affairs and defend its global interests. It was the Soviet threat, not kinship, that made the UK lean towards the latter – a fateful decision which forced Britain to embrace nuclear weaponry to make its voice heard on the other side of the Atlantic. Heuser maintains that British nuclear policy aimed at Washington more than at Moscow (p.34), as Britain looked for a 'special relationship' with the United States, to keep the US entangled in European affairs, and to safeguard joint decision making. London willingly broke with Lord Palmerston's famous dictum that Great Britain had 'no permanent allies but only permanent interests' (pp.32, 36). Instead, NATO became the mainstay of British defence policy, for it secured the transatlantic link and barred the US from a return to isolationism. 'Interdependence' dictated British policy. 'Interdependence' was considered a triumph of morality and justice in international relations, a triumph for British leadership in world affairs. Consequently any 'Third Force' adventures became anathema to British policy.

The author interprets French nuclear mentality as a function of the country's defeat and occupation during the Second World War. France was mainly looking for liberation, liberation from outside threats and domination, but also from internal decay. Nuclear arms were deemed indispensable to achieve that autonomy. A 'nuclear monarchy' – to use the words of Samy Cohen – was formed with the advent of the Fifth Republic. Thereafter, any form of arms control and nuclear non-proliferation frightened the French. According to

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Heuser, arms control threatened the entire political structure of the country (p.84). The drive for independence and emancipation made France not only recoil from arms control but also from integrated defence structures. Heuser concludes convincingly that France therefore never supported schemes for a European Nuclear Force. Instead, French leaders glibly declared that 'The French deterrent force is European by the virtue that it is French' (p.107). This fixation on sovereignty and autarky made cooperation difficult. Cooperation with Britain to liberate Europe from satellization proved impossible due to the special Anglo-American relationship, which in the French view made Britain a 'client state' of the United States (p.116). Cooperation with Germany, on the other hand, faltered due to the fact that France was not prepared to grant West Germany equal status. In the last resort French national defence served only one purpose, namely the preservation of the 'sanctuary' from incursions of all kind. This is mirrored by the French 'doctrine of nuclear deterrence *tous azimuts*, in all directions of the compass' – encompassing friend and foe alike (p.127). The result was a new form of neutralism, '*le neutralisme tricolore*' (p.129). The defence of national sovereignty made France withdraw in large part from the Western 'security community', for the Atlantic Alliance could only be reformed from without. To France, independence – and not interdependence – was the pre-requisite for a successful transformation of the Atlantic Alliance into a two pillared structure.

Heuser asserts that the quest for redemption shaped the political culture of the Federal Republic. To break with the National and Socialist past and to follow a clearly democratic course has become the *raison d'état* of the Federal Republic (p.181). Bonn governments, therefore, were under constant pressure not to pursue an affirmative foreign policy. War in particular has become an anathema. Strong peace movements emerged. Anti-militarism was common. Few Germans dared to talk about national interests. Farsighted politicians, therefore, embraced integration as a way of emancipation from the past (p.211). The Federal Republic, therefore, stood in unquestionable loyalty to NATO and the *Pax Americana*. In defence planning security always took precedence over status and sovereignty. The prevalent anti-Communism and the perception to stand in the first line of defence against 'Communist barbarism' only reinforced Germany's loyalty to the transatlantic structure. Détente was regarded with suspicion, as a Soviet tool to undermine Western solidarity. Only after a long and painful process of soul-searching did

the West German public adopt détente (p.213). In short, the United States became the moral guide of the Federal Republic (p.216), the German–American alliance a second constitutional law (p.219). The Federal Republic, therefore, never toyed with ideas of a European ‘Third Force’ independent from both superpowers. A United Europe had to be constructed within an Atlantic framework (p.219). The entire defence cooperation with France from Adenauer to Kohl served – according to Heuser – only one purpose, namely to create or strengthen a European pillar of NATO. To sum up, a quest for a radical break with the past and the quest for losing themselves in a greater, democratic community made the Federal Republic support European and Atlantic integration (p.229). German Foreign policy is focused on a new identity. Combining the findings of the three case studies, Heuser concludes in formulating the above mentioned thesis, namely that strategy is defined as a function of the political culture in which it is formulated.

The European defence cooperation since the 1990s and its influence on transatlantic relations is analyzed in Jolyon Howorth’s *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?* and Sir Michael Quinlan’s *European Defense Cooperation. Asset or Threat to NATO?* Howorth’s brilliant study focuses on the importance of the declaration of St Malo for the process of European defence integration. According to Howorth, prior to St Malo the United Kingdom exercised an effective veto on any structured link between the EEC/EU and European defence issues, which had condemned all initiatives in this field to failure (p.2). He maintains that the United Kingdom traditionally considered defence the sole responsibility of NATO. Released from the peculiar constraints of the Cold War, a Franco-British defence partnership now offered the opportunity of a reevaluation of Western defence structures. The St Malo process, leading to the Cologne and Helsinki EU Councils, opened vistas leaving a ‘mere pillar of the alliance’ (p.4) far behind. First glimpses of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) become visible going far beyond the NATO military restructuring plan for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Howorth’s study intends to make CESDP, its genesis and future, more visible. The CESDP is a reaction to the transformation of NATO during the Cold War into a hegemonic alliance dominated by the United States. With the end of the Cold War, attempts to rebalance the Alliance emerged but – according to Howorth – failed. The Maastricht Treaty of European Union only began to put in place the

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embryonic structures required for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The project to create a European pillar, however, faltered for the Europeans proved totally incapable to handle the tragic situation of the Balkans.

European access to NATO assets through Combined Joint Task Forces unleashed a political process, which 'eventually led to the St. Malo summit' (p.23) and on to the CESDP. The incompetence of the EU led Tony Blair in 1998 to reverse British policy and to advocate 'an autonomous political and military capacity for the EU'. The UK had finally endorsed a European defence capacity overseen politically by the EU. The European pillar now became something much more important than a 'techno-military facility permitting the Europeans to borrow vital NATO assets in order to carry out peace missions authorized by the' North Atlantic Council (NAC, p.26). At the EU Council of Cologne the EU bestowed upon itself the necessary institutional framework, in Helsinki it established the target of the Headline Goal. The CESDP was born. In contrast to ESDI launched by NAC in 1994, CESDP was clearly a EU project. Howorth is able to show that both approaches to European security nowadays coexist. Today the question lies in the definition of the relationship between the two, that is, in defining a new transatlantic balance. Howorth maintains that despite the joint sponsorship of the St Malo process, Britain and France continue to epitomise the two contrasting positions on Atlanticism/Europeanism (p.47). The United Kingdom mainly supports CESDP to permanently lock the United States into the structures of European security. France, by contrast, has sponsored CESDP to liberate Europe from its dependence on the US in security affairs (p.48). However, agreement exists that CSDP should serve to rebalance the Alliance in order to increase its overall strength (p.54). The indivisibility of the Alliance has been accepted by all partners (p.54). On this basis a dialogue has begun about the future relations between NATO and the EU. Although CESDP is not opposed in Washington, the US insists on firm guidelines in order to safeguard US influence in Europe (p.65).

Howorth stresses that not only the future of the transatlantic relationship but the form of European defence institutions remains to be determined. The EU has to define its mission. Europe has to resist the temptation of neo-colonialism. 'CESDP should not be an instrument for perpetuating colonial or neo-colonial hegemony' (p.80). Europe has to refrain from embarking on a universalizing project gradually embracing all the nations of the earth (p.79). The

EU enlargement process – necessary to stabilize the security environment in Europe – might necessitate the formation of a federal inner circle to safeguard the essence of the project of ever closer union (p.81). First signs of a ‘supranational inter-governmentalism’ have become visible, which leads Howorth to conclude that interdependence might result in a gradual federalization of the CESDP. Furthermore, CESDP might even lead to the emergence of a distinct European Security culture, based on distinctively European norms and principles, and thus to a further federalization, for legitimacy is at the heart of governance (p.90). Howorth concludes that to legitimize the actions of the European institutions parliamentary oversight will become indispensable – possibly in the form of a European Constitution.

Sir Michael Quinlan’s study has a narrower focus. It is mainly concerned with the effect of an ESDP on transatlantic relations. After a brief but masterly survey of Cold War efforts to enhance practical cooperation among European countries, from the WU to the relaunch of the WEU in the 1980s, and brief sketches of cooperation within FINABEL, EURONAD, IEPG and WEAG, to further European arms cooperation, Quinlan concentrates on the St Malo process. According to him, Cold War efforts are of limited interest, as the Soviet threat made the Europeans place their cooperative schemes primarily within the Alliance, and in particular its integrated structure. The overall achievement was therefore hardly impressive (p.13). This, however, changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The end of the Cold War opened an opportunity, which was instantly seized by France to liberate Europe from NATO dominance. The French attempts, however, were widely resisted. The flexible adaptation of NATO to the changed environment, US insistence on a security dialogue within NATO, and the experience of the Gulf War, which made the limitations of European defence capabilities all too visible, hampered the far-reaching French reform plans (p.18). The neo-Gaullist aspirations came to naught. The reform attempts were limited to the ESDI initiative which, according to Quinlan, was firmly embedded within the Alliance. The French, however, had managed to re-launch the WEU as a security organization for out-of-area task and crisis management (p.20). The creation of EUROCORPS supplemented this development. The US viewed the WEU warily and reacted by proposing Combined Joint Task Forces, thereby safeguarding NATO guidance and control over WEU crisis management (pp.22, 26). The breakthrough in European defence

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cooperation came with the *volte-face* of the British defence posture at St Malo in 1998. Britain finally sided with the French in demanding that collective European defence efforts henceforth should be carried forward under the aegis of EU (p.27).

The Declaration of St Malo, demanding 'a capacity of autonomous action backed by credible military forces' (p.29) for the EU, surpassed the WEU and put the EU firmly in the driving seat. The Labour government was determined to overcome the chastening Gulf and Balkan experiences. Quinlan argues that the UK initiative lacked any neo-Gaullist or 'Third Force' aspirations. Intended was a military capability without prejudice to NATO, to enable Europe to act, where NATO as a whole was not engaged. NATO, however, retained the right of initiative. If NATO refused to act, the EU would be allowed to do so (pp.36ff.). Lacking capabilities forced the EU to adopt headline goals, to enable the EU to deploy within 60 days a force of 60,000 for a period of up to one year (p.39). Again, nothing was done to undermine NATO. The Europeans paid tribute to the three Ds, namely no discrimination of non-EU NATO members, no duplication of NATO efforts and capabilities and no decoupling of European security from North America (p.50).

The author concludes that ESDP will only succeed if French political doctrine is met by the vigilance and counter-resolve of the majority, in order to achieve a solid and confident transatlantic partnership as the basis for European and global security. A second pre-requisite is the 'concrete delivery of stronger and more usable military capability' (p.81). This will require a substantial allocation of resources to defence. Achievements in both fields will create a healthy balance and thereby strengthen the Alliance. A fair burden sharing would result, that would serve the interest of all, Europeans and the United States alike (p.82).

In the light of the importance of the change of parameters in British defence policy at St Malo, it seems justifiable to terminate the review with a study on British defence policy, Stuart Croft and others, *Britain and Defence 1945–2000: A Policy Re-evaluation*. This volume consists of seven article-sized chapters by Andrew Dorman (2), Wyn Rees (2), Matthew Uttley (2) and Stuart Croft. The volume seeks to put British postwar decline into an ideological, rather than a purely material, context. To utilize a constructivist vocabulary, the book tries to synthesize 'a British way in defence' (p.6), not by a comparative approach, but by identifying key agents of change and decision-making within the UK. The review will cover only three of the seven

articles, namely those compatible with the general theme: European security. Andrew Dorman's analysis of crises and reviews in British defence policy focuses on the genesis of the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the Defence White Paper of 1957, the Mason and Nott Reviews, the Options for Change Exercise (1990) and the Strategic Defence Review. According to Dorman, four assumptions underlie all those reviews, namely: (1) concern about the Soviet Union or their successor states; (2) concern about the special relationship; (3) the creation and maintenance of a nuclear deterrent; and (4) the ability to influence decisions on a world stage (p.24). The reviews clearly show spending priorities, reflecting the international environment. Defence spending is therefore not governed solely by the domestic agenda. The author maintains that contractions were not only due to budgetary constraints, but were essentially voluntary, and open to be altered by successor governments (p.24). These findings are confirmed by the two contributions by Wyn Rees covering Britain's global and European role. According to Rees, the British perceive it as their mission to preserve order around the globe. London, however, realized that to continue to fulfil this mission in the postwar world, assistance – at least temporary – was indispensable. The preservation of the Anglo-American 'special relationship', therefore, was high on the political agenda of Whitehall. To remain a valuable partner, Britain felt obliged to preserve a capability for independent military action, in other words nationally balanced forces (p.37). The dream of rebuilding Great Britain's great power status upon the resources of the Commonwealth never materialized. Its decline in international standing made Great Britain fall back on Europe as a power base. The author, however, argues that Britain never entirely retreated from world affairs. The Falklands war reemphasized Great Britain's global ambitions and capabilities, and finally put a halt to the retreat from global positions (p.41). Since then Great Britain has reestablished its internationalist agenda, increased its involvement in international peace-keeping, putting 'defence diplomacy' high on the political agenda. Internationalism was renewed, albeit in a new framework. Henceforth, Britain's sense of global mission has been conducted alongside the United States. 'The alternative for Britain lies to enhance its own capability and act in concert with its European Allies' (p.45).

Europe has always been vital to Britain's national interests. Britain, however, differed from its continental partners about the type of Europe it wanted to see develop. The UK was reluctant to be

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tied into European security arrangements; it favoured transatlantic security arrangements. Faced with the fundamental dilemma to seek to build a coalition of European countries to face the Soviet threat or to entangle the US on the European Continent, Britain opted for the latter due to the Soviet threat. This decision was defended and upheld during the entire Cold War. Rees argues that 'Britain has consistently resisted continental initiatives that it interpreted as seeking to compete with NATO' (p.52). The UK nevertheless saw the need for a more coherent European voice. But all reform attempts were designed to bolster the cohesion of the Alliance, not to create an independent ESDI. Britain never supported a 'Third Force' movement, never doubted the overriding importance of Anglo-American cooperation. The Atlanticism of Britain made the it incredibly influential within NATO, leaving a definite imprint on NATO strategy (p.55). According to Rees, it has always been the highest priority for London to bind the United States into European security, in order to face the threat from the East, and to overcome historical differences among the Europeans (p.56). Even after the end of the Cold War, with the emergence of a broader array of risks that could lead to the destabilization of Europe, Britain tried to ensure that NATO retained its position as the principle defence organization (p.61). NATO seemed indispensable to maintain order, to maintain Western core values after the unifying glue of the external threat had vanished. The primacy of the Alliance had to be insured. This was achieved in 1996, with the decision of the NAC to give NATO the right to choose whether to be the lead organization in future crisis management (p.62). Rees argues that it was the Bosnian experience that created the rift in Anglo-American relations which made the British rethink their allegiance. In 1998 Britain took steps to enhance Europe's capability to act independently in military terms. London agreed to a military capability within the framework of European integration, 'something that Britain has eschewed since the demise of the EDC' (p.63). It was, however, no desire to create a 'Third Force' that led the Blair government to shift its policy, but the risk of the US becoming frustrated by the incapability of the Europeans to act. Britain therefore insisted that European defence capabilities must be enhanced in a manner compatible with NATO. The UK, according to Rees, remains faithful to its Atlanticism.

It is striking that all the books under review here underline the importance of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' for Britain's foreign policy. Striking, as well, is that the 'special relationship' is

perceived as being in the best interest of the UK. Similarly, all authors maintain that Britain has always been a firm NATO supporter, has never challenged the transatlantic partnership. Furthermore, agreement seems to exist among the authors that European defence developed entirely independent from the integration process after the demise of the EDC project. Therefore, only traces of a European Defence Identity are identifiable during the Cold War. This is the common creed. The common interpretation further maintains that defence was reintroduced into the integration process with the fall of the Wall as a means to control a reunified Germany.

This common denominator, however, can be challenged. The notion that Britain has always been a loyal supporter of NATO is questionable. After 1945, Britain initially had a vision of Europe.<sup>3</sup> This concept, however, was incompatible with US postwar plans for the future order of Europe. This made British plans falter. All the books under review, albeit to varying degrees, neglect the factor of America. Was it not the aim of US European policy to create a regime that would outlast US presence, and would simultaneously guarantee US hegemony and allow a degree of disengagement? A European Federation served this purpose. Furthermore, a focus on political aims – instead of national and alliance strategies – might lead to an entirely different interpretation of Alliance history, and therefore of European security and defence cooperation. Given the preponderance of US power, Alliance structures and strategies might have been used to serve first and foremost the US-imposed order of Europe and not the defence of the European continent. Under these premises a reinterpretation of the defence policies of Britain, France and the Federal Republic seems possible that could challenge the influence of belief systems and mentalities. Under this perspective the foreign and defence policies and national strategies of Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic would be nothing but conventional reactions to US diplomacy. As stressed by Howorth, Aybet and Heuser, Great Britain in its postwar planning focused on the formation of a European bloc under British leadership to cope with the Soviet threat after an assumed retreat of the US into isolationism. This policy bore fruit with the formation of the Brussels Pact of 1948. The WU, a fully fledged European defence organization, emerged. The WU, however, was melted down with the outbreak of the Korean War to avoid a duplication of NATO structures. The intensification of the Cold War, indeed, put an end to the European experiment, and led – in Howorth's terms – to the emergence of the

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hegemonic partnership so characteristic of the Cold War period.<sup>4</sup> Recent archival releases, however, question the assumption that no attempts were undertaken to recover the lost European Defence Identity. Thereafter, the notion that Great Britain had entirely given up the dream of creating a 'Third Force' seems incorrect. Was the WEU only a tool to find a solution for German rearmament, or also a British or Franco-British attempt during the first détente triggered by Stalin's death to recover the initiative in Europe by basing the European construction on an intergovernmental platform? The fact that the WEU did not develop into the nucleus of European Unity might have been due to US interference, for it was the United States and not the Europeans that separated European integration from defence arrangements. This separation served US control of European affairs, served US postwar planning, in the form of the construction of a European Federation on the continent. Great Britain and France rebelled against the US ordering of Europe, which undermined the plans of the European powers to emancipate Europe by building 'EURAFRICA', a combination of Europe and its dependencies. Those plans faltered at Suez in 1956.<sup>5</sup> To forestall any repetition of an Anglo-French challenge to the US ordering of Europe, the United States recreated the Anglo-American 'special relationship' in 1957/58. The US might have followed a classic strategy of *divide et impera* and separated Britain from the continent to safeguard the emergence of a European Federation. The above-mentioned interpretation of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' is therefore also open to question.<sup>6</sup> Whom did the 'special relationship' serve? The maintenance of the 'special relationship' might indeed have been in the US and not in the British interest, being a means to keep Britain aloof from the continent, as long as a supranational structure of Europe was not assured. Prerequisite for British membership in the EEC was the preservation of a supranational European construction and Atlantic defence structures. Britain – and Germany – embraced NATO only after their concepts of Europe had proved mutually exclusive, leading to a stalemate in European affairs. While London favoured an intergovernmental construction which would allow Anglo-French leadership of Europe, Germany favoured the US model, namely integration. Not being able to follow the nuclear policies of Britain and France due to the arms control regime of the Paris Agreements, but determined not to accept a status inferior to that of its neighbours, the Federal Republic favoured the delegation of

authority to international organizations. To put it more bluntly, for a country discriminated against as the Federal Republic was, supranationalism meant equality. As the European partners continued to deny Germany equal status, Bonn pursued integration. The quest for equality made the Federal Republic one of the most outspoken supporters of NATO. Germany's insistence on integration was backed by Washington in order to forestall a challenge to US hegemony in Europe and to safeguard Germany's equal status, indispensable to safeguarding nuclear non-proliferation in Europe.<sup>7</sup>

Given the fact that US policy might have dictated affairs in Europe, French policy will appear less mystical and can be interpreted as a rational reaction to the US integration of Europe, which – in the last resort – was aiming at a denuclearized continent to enable an agreement with the Soviet Union on an all-European security architecture, thus leaving the wing powers of Europe in control. Such a policy leading to the discrimination of the continent would explain not only French filibustering, but also German flirtation with de Gaulle's policy. Although powerful anti-militarist currents emerged, although religious moralism was deeply rooted, an altruistic policy never gained priority in the Federal Republic. The notion of a nuclear-free zone as propagated by the SPD opposition was rejected by the government to forestall possible discrimination. Similarly, détente was initially viewed with suspicion in Bonn, which feared that any settlement between the superpowers would necessarily freeze the status quo and thereby discriminate against Germany. Redemption surely has always been high on the political agenda of Germany, and shaped the country's political culture up to reunification and beyond. Archival evidence, however, suggests that emancipation always took precedence.

Looking at NATO and the European Institutions as instruments of a policy of establishing a security order or architecture will help to explain the survival of the security regime of the Cold War in the absence of the external factors which, according to Aybet, shaped it – namely the superpower squeeze and the Soviet threat. The notion that the European security structures are maintained in the absence of power as a regulating force is questionable. Although no archival evidence is available for the post-Cold War era, it can be maintained that the power regulating European security, the United States, has lost neither influence nor interest in European security. To the contrary, in the light of past experience, it seems that the United States is engaged in an extension of the Western European security

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architecture to the whole of Europe, to safeguard an environment in which democracy can flourish. Only when democracy has taken root in Eastern Europe will the US reconstruction of Europe be completed. Furthermore, none of the Cold War institutions have lost their function. The main purpose of NATO, WEU or EC/EEC/EU has always been to organize a peaceful European order which could be utilized as a basis for an all-European settlement, and not just to meet a Soviet threat.<sup>8</sup> In short, the security regime of the Cold War survived because the US reconstruction of Europe is still unfulfilled. This US-maintained regime, in contrast to the nascent European security cooperation, is not challenged by 'external' dynamics in the post-Cold War era. The US insistence on a rapid enlargement of Western institutions and the quick development of rapid reaction forces for crisis management, strengthened by the events of 11 September 2001, serves the maintenance of the Cold War regime, and might lead to conflicts of interest between the United States and Europe, and among the European states. An instant or premature development of a Common Security and Defence Policy might not lead to a federalization of Europe – as maintained by Howorth – but to the destruction of the emerging European security architecture. Global engagements should, therefore, follow the creation of a European Political Union, and not vice versa. The functional approach will serve only those states within the EU with advanced military capabilities, namely Great Britain and France, and thereby destroy the unity necessary to build Europe. A functional approach in the post-Cold War world serves the maintenance of US hegemony in Europe, as the federal approach served that aim during the Cold War. Only federal structures, only the creation of a European Political Union (EPU) as the control centre for a CESDP will guarantee equality, so indispensable for a Europe to grow. A CESDP, therefore, will only serve Europe after Europe's construction has been crowned by a constitution. Similarly EU enlargement has to be met by a deepening of European structures.

This analysis demonstrates that any attempt to explain European security cooperation without the larger Atlantic security context falls short of being realistic. A distinction of internal and external dynamics can surely serve as a heuristic tool, to further our insight, but does it conform to the complexity of the subject? Is not an attempt to separate US influences from European security and a separation of European integration from European cooperative arrangements artificial? Neither the US reconstruction of Europe, nor

designs of European states are bound to a certain form, a certain institution or a certain group of states. Institutions seem to be nothing else than means to further a certain aim; preferences conform to the given circumstances, more than to a political culture and in the last resort reflect nothing but the search of the state to maximize its 'relative gain'. To assume integrationist dynamics or spill-over effects in the realm of 'high politics' – to use a neo-Realist term – therefore remains doubtful. Did not the construction of Europe emerge out of a struggle between the United States and the European states about the future order of Europe, based on a new balance of power? The current rebalancing of the Atlantic Alliance, the attempts to emancipate Europe from the US reconstruction of the European continent may falter yet again. This would be due to state rivalries and an all too ambitious internationalist agenda detracting from the main task lying ahead, namely the conscious construction of Europe, the '*Grand Messe*' which would sanctify the creation of a European Army responsible to a European President.

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## Corrigendum

Endnotes 1–33 in ‘Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside’, by Petr Lunák, *Cold War History* 3/2 (January 2003), pp.53–82, were numbered incorrectly. Readers should deduct one to arrive at the correct endnote. We apologize for the mistake and encourage any concerned readers to contact the author directly: [petrl7@hotmail.com](mailto:petrl7@hotmail.com).