Reviews

Hans-Jürgen Goertz, *The Anabaptists*, trans. Trevor Johnson, Routledge, London, 1996; ISBN 0–415–08238–2; xviii + 215 pp.; £45

This new translation of Hans-Jürgen Goertz's *Die Täufer, Geschichte und Deutung*, which first appeared in German in 1980, is in fact something like a third edition, since it includes material present neither in the first edition nor in the second German edition of 1988. There is a new introduction, a new chapter (ch. 5) devoted to the social behaviour of ordinary Anabaptists, and additional material elsewhere. Although the book is a well-established one, its argument bears revisiting in the light of this latest recension. A first chapter presents a succinct summary of the various Anabaptist groups and their early history. Chapters 2–4 offer a thematically organized discussion of the ideas of the major early Anabaptist leaders from Konrad Grebel through to Menno Simons: attitudes to clergy, scripture, ethics (ch. 2); baptism (ch. 3); church, community, and relations with government (ch. 4). The sixth chapter examines the persecutions and martyrdom of the early members of the sects.

It is a striking achievement that Goertz can handle so diverse a subject in a book whose main text runs to less than 140 pages. It is the more remarkable, since Goertz decisively abandons the older historiography which tried to construe an 'ideal' or 'true' Anabaptism out of the various groups scattered across Switzerland and the Empire. He gives full consideration to their diverse origins and mutually inconsistent beliefs: some were millennarians preparing for the apocalyptic battle, others were peace-loving seekers after a religious community on earth. One leader worked contentedly as the servant of successive city councils, others would have nothing to do with magistracy in any form. Even believers' baptism proves not to be an infallible distinguishing mark at every stage. One virtue of this thematic treatment is precisely that it throws disagreements between the various Anabaptist ideologues into relief. There is a problem, however, with the sheer brevity of Goertz's exposé. What he has written is a set of short critical essays in response to the revisionist history of Anabaptism which appeared in the 1970s, in the work of writers like Stayer, Deppermann or Clasen. He takes quite a lot of knowledge for granted in the reader; the dense texture of the argument requires one already to possess some grasp of the issues.

Goertz's discussion reads, in the main, as a balanced and sensitive treatment of the disputed questions. He makes the rather striking observation that ordinary Anabaptists would in all probability not

European History Quarterly Copyright © 1999 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 29(1), 157–176.
[0265-6914(199901)29:1;157–176;007769]

have recognized the subtle theological differences between the various groups which are so evident to theological historians today (114). He shows sympathy to the Anabaptist groups, but not uncritically, given that he is revising the old hagiographical histories of Bender, Yoder and their kind. The absence of excessive adulation comes as a relief when compared with Goertz's special pleading for Thomas Müntzer in his *Thomas Müntzer: Apocalyptic Mystic and Revolutionary* (English edition, Edinburgh 1993). Yet Goertz is judgemental: he can allow himself some positively Olympian utterances, as for instance that 'heresy, rebellion and blasphemy cannot justify denying the Anabaptists their martyrs' crowns' (130). He approves of religious communalism based on the self-expression of ordinary people. Conversely, he is repelled by the rigid authoritarianism, the mutual excommunications and fierce internal discipline which characterized (for instance) the later sixteenth-century Mennonites. He seems preoccupied with the concepts here translated as 'free church' and 'community church' (e.g. 85ff, 94), renderings of German ideal-types which have no precise lexical or historiographical equivalents in English.

Goertz has one fixation, which appears repeatedly through this book until it becomes somewhat irritating. He is obsessed with 'anticlericalism', a term which he uses, not only to mean hostility to the power and pretensions of the clergy, but also opposition to any sort of priestcraft, even in the sphere of theology and worship. Given Goertz's evident distaste for academic theologians in his *Thomas Müntzer*, and his attempt to interpret the entire early Reformation in terms of anticlericalism in his *Pfaffenhaß und groß Geschrei*, this causes little surprise. Yet he stretches the meaning of 'anticlericalism' beyond the point of its elasticity, as when the mutual excommunications among the Mennonites are ascribed to 'internalized anticlerical passion' (91 and cf. 97). When it is invoked as the only thing that binds the various Anabaptist groups together (133) one feels that the concept can no longer bear the weight imposed on it.

If one remains aware of Goertz's *idée fixe*, and brings a basic prior knowledge of the subject to bear, this book offers a valuable and thoughtful discussion, well deserving of an English translation. Its usefulness is enhanced by a short collection of excerpts from source texts (136–62) and a detailed chronological table (163–79).

Euan Cameron
University of Newcastle upon Tyne

P.M.H. Bell, *France and Britain, 1900–40: Entente and Estrangement*, London and New York, Longman, 1996; ISBN 0–582–22953–7; 275 pp.; £13.50
Robert Young, *France and the Origins of the Second World War*, London, Macmillan, 1996; ISBN 0–333–57553–9; 200 pp.; £13.99
J.F.V. Keiger, *Raymond Poincaré*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; ISBN 0–521–57387–4; 413 pp.; £40

All these works discuss the history of the French Third Republic (1870–1940). While this was the longest lasting French regime since the Revolution of 1789, it is rarely remembered with respect. The works by P.M.H. Bell and Robert Young consider the reasons for the Republic's collapse in 1940, while Keiger's biography of Raymond Poincaré explores the political life of the Republic in the early twentieth century.

Some six years ago, Gianna Pomata threw down a challenge to textbook writers: 'I do not know of a history textbook that openly admits any gaps in our knowledge or that presents historical knowledge as an open-ended research process' ('History, Particular and Universal: on reading some recent women's history textbooks', *Feminist Studies* 19:1 (1993), 42). I have no idea whether Bell or Young have read Pomata's provocative essay, but both of their works seem to be responding to her observations.

Unusually for a textbook, Bell's work starts with a consideration of the intangibility of knowledge, noting how the relationship between France and Britain was often shaped by a process of mutual stereotyping, and a selective reading of historical experience. Throughout his work Bell stresses the importance of this process, and provides summaries of key contemporary works which contributed to it. The bulk of his volume is careful to avoid the sloppy anthromorphization of nations which results in lazy phrases such as 'France thought that . . .'. Bell skilfully traverses the slippery tightrope between over-generalization and over-qualification: while refusing to trade in easy stereotypes of 'national character', he nonetheless presents clear, coherent concepts of British and French political traditions.

His work starts by examining how the early nineteenth-century hostility between the countries gradually developed into the ill-defined but clearly friendly Entente Cordiale of 1904. One of the most attractive features of this work is its refusal to attribute blame to either side when considering the tense and awkward moments of Franco–British contacts. Bell's discussion of Franco–British relations during the First World War is a small masterpiece in its own right: at once dispassionate, sensitive, and genuinely provocative.

The work ends by considering Franco–British relations prior to 1940, noting the miscalculations on both sides which contributed to the defeat of 1940.

The focus of Robert Young's work is different. He also considers French foreign policy, but does not privilege the Franco–British relationship. As was the case in Bell's work, the first chapters consider historiographic themes. However, in some ways, Young is more ambitious. One difference between the two writers is that Young 'personalizes' his history-writing more, describing his own relationship to the development of scholarship. He ends his first chapter with the words 'now is the time to admit that this chapter is the work of a story-teller, which is not quite the same thing as saying a fabrication. I have taken what I consider to be the "facts", and assembled them in a way not done before' (36). Such statements reflect a profound re-thinking about the nature of historical knowledge, and their honesty is to be welcomed — but I can't help thinking that Young's words will terrify most first-year students. The second chapter is an extended historiographical essay, analysing the difficulties which historians face in considering the 'Strange Defeat' of 1940. This section was obviously a good idea, but it has a truncated, summarized feel to it, and reads more like an annotated bibliography than a full thematic review.

The subsequent chapters discuss significant themes in the formation of French foreign policy, looking as much at the social forces which were working 'behind the scenes' as at the actions of diplomats. Thus, Young includes discussions on opinion formation with the National Assembly (82–5) and French perceptions of Nazi economic policy, considered here as a factor in the formation of French attitudes to Germany (99–100). Chapter 6 considers the military and political condition of France immediately before 1940, and argues that the sense of national unity was stronger than has often been considered by historians. Young's conclusion is refreshing and original in its tone, warning of the dangers of 'history as trial', and ending with a surprising defence of 'ambivalence' as a historical response.

J.F.V. Keiger accurately sums up Poincaré as 'the hero of normalcy and moderation', and he notes the difficulties faced by an autobiographer in writing about such a man: 'stability is neither exciting nor truly memorable, but it is essential' (344). Keiger is to be congratulated for writing such an interesting study of such a dull man. His *Raymond Poincaré* includes sections on Poincaré's marriage and private life, but avoids any psychological analysis of the private man, and the work as a whole concentrates on the public actions of this leading politician. The most interesting chapters

discuss Poincaré's rise, from provincial lawyer to political leader. Poincaré typifies a characteristically French version of moderate Republicanism. Keiger correctly describes him as 'quintessentially . . . bourgeois' (32). His political commitments reflected this background. 'He looked to the Left on the religious question, but sympathised with the Right on the social question' (98). One of the great strengths of Keiger's book is to provide a lively, well-researched and convincing portrait of this strand of political culture.

Perhaps the one interesting aspect of Poincaré's personality was his choice to use a female pseudonym when writing one of his four novels (23). While many women writers chose to use either masculine or gender-neutral pseudonyms, I cannot think of any other male writers who adopted a female name. However, while Keiger does note in passing Poincaré's limited sympathy for some aspects of feminism, this point is not explored in detail.

Poincaré's main advantage over other politicians of the Third Republic was that he was free from any taint of dishonesty or corruption. His principal contribution to the development of political culture during the twentieth century was to develop the calculated use of nationalism as an alternative focus for parliamentary coalition to the Republican Left's use of anti-clericalism. This policy was put to great service during the First World War with Poincaré's sponsorship of the Union Sacrée (Holy Union) of the different factions of French Republicanism.

Of the three books, there is no doubt that the work by Young is the most ambitious and the most modern, but the quality of the writing and presentation is a little uneven, and not always quite geared toward an undergraduate market. Keiger's biography is a solid, competent work, in the tradition of political biography written by generations of British historians, but both its style and its subject matter ignore most of the advances in historiography in the past thirty years. Bell's book is finely written and well researched, but more conservative in its approach.

Sharif Gemie
University of Glamorgan

Robert Aldrich, *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion*, London, Macmillan, 1996; ISBN 0–333–56739–0 (hbk), 0–333–56740–4 (pbk); 392 pp.; £47.50, £15.50

Aldrich's introduction to *Greater France* recognizes the complexity of writing colonial histories, the diversity of sources and the colonial

and anti-colonial perspectives which need addressing. Yet while acknowledging that colonial history is about the colonizer and the colonized, Aldrich's book is still dominated by the Eurocentric perspective. The political history of chapters 2 and 3 is written in a style which privileges the colonizers' viewpoint: 'Every adventurer to the mystical city [of Tombouctou] seemed doomed . . .' and 'Indochina looked the best remaining prize in Southeast Asia . . .'. These two chapters at first seem to stand at odds with the remaining perspective of the book, which is critical of the excesses of colonialism and does make some attempt to express anti-colonial viewpoints. Yet while it is clear that Aldrich is trying to analyse the ideologies of colonialism, the Eurocentrism of the text remains. In his chapter on 'Ideas of Empire', for example, the sections on anti-colonialism concentrate entirely on French socialist and communist resistance and do not refer to thoughts and theories held by indigenous peoples in the empire, although a narrative history of various uprisings is discussed later in the chapter on 'Colonial Nationalism and Decolonisation'. And in the very short section on colonial economies, Aldrich does not consider the devastation which occurred to indigenous economies, and does not even refer to a previous economic history, an approach which apart from being exclusive is a-historical.

Aldrich, too, despite his discussion of colonial culture in this history of French overseas expansion, seems immune to post-colonial theory and colonial discourse theory, both of which have developed a sophisticated analysis of the way in which the acquisition of knowledge about colonies acted *within* the context of political expansion, and not as an adjunct or reflection of it. The whole discourse of the relationship between knowledge and power is ignored. Even his one passing reference to Edward Said simply discusses Said as having pointed out 'how imperial expansion permeated European culture'. Yet Said, and others since, have tried to say much more than this in the analysis of the way in which literature, art, and science were used to promote the legitimacy of colonial rule, as well as to gather information in order to rule subjects more effectively. Aldrich's references to information-gathering do not acknowledge its role in consolidating imperial control and affirming racist ideologies, but instead narrate the development of anthropology, for example, in an unproblematic fashion; thus he states: 'The study of foreign societies, not surprisingly, received a big boost from French conquests.' Aldrich is clearly at odds with the writers and scholars who have advanced the ideas of colonial discourse theory, although he never openly attacks them. With regard to scientific research he declares: 'It would be unfair to castigate all colonial scientists as

lackeys of expansionism', and when discussing the work of Orientalist painters in this period, he runs to the defence of Delacroix, stating: 'His works were not propaganda, but they broadcast the exoticism of Africa.' Yet Africa is only 'exotic' to the European.

Aldrich's approach to history and the study of culture often appears contradictory. While he runs to the defence of the 'great' names in French art and literature, such as Delacroix and Albert Camus, he is happy to acknowledge the role of lesser artists and writers in perpetuating colonial myths. Yet were not the main figures in French art and culture during this period also influenced by their time? While many may not wish to read Delacroix as simply a propagandist, he was a painter who received government patronage and represented dominant ideas in his day. His paintings did not, as Aldrich suggests, simply reflect North Africa as an exotic and picturesque landscape. The *Death of Sardonapolis*, for example, represents the Orient as barbaric, sexually promiscuous, ruled by ruthless tyrants *as well as being exotic*. In this way, the painting is created as the antipathy of the West, and worked alongside the countless other orientalist representations to legitimate European presence in the 'Orient' — which was of course itself a shifting commodity. Camus' novels, too, are highly representative of French settler perspectives of Algeria. His image of Arabs is stereotypical and we are given no avenue to identify with the Arab man who is murdered by the key protagonist in *L'Etranger.* Camus' attitude towards Algeria is also typical of most 'pieds noirs' in his representation of Algeria as a woman with whom he has sexual encounters and also a place that bears traces of Greco-Roman history in *Noces suivi L'Été*. The latter point was one of the arguments used by French settlers to proclaim the legitimacy of 'Algérie Française'.

It is Aldrich's fragmentary approach to history and the study of society that is the most dissatisfying. Political history, for example, is almost entirely divorced from economic history (which is hardly discussed in the book at all), culture is discussed as a reflection of political undercurrents, rather than as part of an integrated process, and towards the end of the book, he surprisingly proclaims: 'What is remarkable is how few long-lasting effects on France the giving up of empire entailed.' In his epilogue, therefore, he does not discuss the racism and xenophobia in France today as a legacy of colonialism, but instead blames the presence of migrants as having 'triggered' the rise.

Anandi Ramamurthy
University of Central Lancashire

Robert F. Byrnes, *V.O. Kliuchevskii, Historian of Russia*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995; ISBN 0–253–32940–X; 301 pp.; US$29.95.
Thomas Prymak, *Mykola Kostomarov: A Biography*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996; ISBN 0–8020–0758–9; 263 pp.; $60.00 (Can)

In a western university, a typical survey course in Russian history begins in tenth-century Kyiv which is dubbed 'the mother of Russian cities'. The textbooks recount that, because of princely feuds, Kyivan Rus became weak and fell to Mongol invaders. Over time, as Mongol control weakened, an ensuing power vacuum was gradually filled by Muscovite princes who undertook a process of 'gathering of Russian lands'. This standard framework has it that Muscovy was the political successor to medieval Kyiv and hence the second of Russia's three capital cities.

Meanwhile, much of former Kyivan Rus was absorbed into the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to this conventional interpretation, the 'reunification of Russia and Ukraine' began in 1654 when the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitskii and envoys of Muscovy's Tsar Alexis signed the Treaty of Pereislavl which formalized the voluntary incorporation of Ukraine into Russia. The reunification was completed with the USSR's wartime invasion and annexation of Galicia and Volhynia. Not surprisingly, this was also the historical framework which was taught in the USSR.

Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii (1841–1911), Moscow University's most eminent historian, was the most influential architect of this interpretation. In this first English-language biography of him, Byrnes describes the life and work of a Russian patriot who eschewed radical politics and believed in the historical appropriateness of Russian territorial expansion. Kliuchevskii's five-volume *Course in Russian History*, published between 1904 and 1910, was his most influential scholarly work. A good writer and an inspiring teacher, he motivated hundreds of people to become teachers, archivists and promoters of Russian studies in general both at home and abroad. So it is that virtually all history texts since then have adopted Kliuchevskii's outline of Russian history.

An alternate interpretation of Eastern Slavic history has been largely ignored. This one has it that Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Russians are separate nationalities which evolved under the influence of disparate historical forces. Its exponents consider Pereislavl to have been an act of union between two independent states. For them, Russia's subsequent annexation of Ukrainian and other lands was a colonizing foreign occupation. One of the principal

developers of this viewpoint was Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), also an elegant writer and a popular teacher. Although Kostomarov's work was done before that of Kliuchevskii, his outline of history is much less familiar. Since 1991, however, interest in it has been reviving and editions of his work have been published in Kyiv and Moscow. Prymak's timely biography of Kostomarov, the first in any language, is part of this renewed interest in the outlines of the history of the Eastern Slavs.

The illegitimate son of a Ukrainian serf and a landowning father, Kostomarov attended the University of Kharkiv. He wrote novels and poetry, collected folklore, and wrote history with a populist and Slavophile bent. 1846 was an important year for him. He became Chair of Russian History at Kyiv University, and he published his *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People* which examined the notion of a distinct Ukrainian nationality. That same year, he composed a Slavophile-type constitution for the Cyril–Methodius Brotherhood whose members, largely scholars, participated in a growing public preoccupation with Ukrainian history, language and culture. Betrayed by a friend, he was arrested on the eve of his wedding, sent to Saint Petersburg's Peter and Paul Fortress, and eventually sentenced to eight years of exile in Saratov.

There, relying on Polish and Cossack chronicles, he studied the Ukrainians' seventeenth century revolt against Poland. The result was a work entitled 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Restoration of Southern Rus to Russia' which appeared after Alexander II rescinded his father's order that none of Kostomarov's works must ever be published. The study saw the Ukrainian people as the heros of the piece, and it made him famous.

His wide ranging research, always done with a populist perspective, also covered Russian themes including the revolt of Stenka Razin, the Time of Troubles, and the Old Believers. Nevertheless, because he was considered a Ukrainophile, he was prohibited from obtaining another position at a Ukrainian university. But through the intervention of friends, he was hired by the University of Saint Petersburg.

Kostomarov's outline of Eastern Slav history had it that six nationalities emerged from the early Rus tribes: Ukrainian, Great Russian, northern, Novgorod, Pskov and Belorussian. The divisions between them were exacerbated by the Mongol conquest after which 'Great Russians' evolved their communal, centralized and absolutist style and Ukrainians became more individualistic and democratic. Although he never advocated Ukrainian political separation from Russia, he encountered widespread chauvinism and intolerance on the part of Russians, conservatives, liberals and socialists alike.

Historians, including the eminent Sergei Soloviev, openly opposed him. Prince Obolensky, the archivist of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, closed the archives to him. 'They consider me an extreme Ukrainophile', he wrote, but went on 'history is not a panegyric. I have never denied the historical significance of either Moscow or the Great Russian people, but I just cannot be enthusiastic about Muscovite "orders" and Great Russian culture' (154).

Kostomarov was a direct forerunner of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ukraine's most famous historian who was hounded to death in 1934. In the soviet period, their scholarly influence largely faded away in east and west alike. Prymak's timely and eminently readable biography of this leader of the awakening of nineteenth-century Ukrainian consciousness is part of a recent revival of interest. It is an engaging account of the life of a prolific historian, a contributor to the Ukrainian literary language, and an ethnographer who searched for the soul of the common people in the restrictive cultural and political Russian milieu. It provides revealing insights into the complex question of inter-ethnic relations in Eastern Europe.

Life was much simpler for Kliuchevskii, Kostomarov's younger contemporary. His Russian-centred viewpoint offended neither tsarists nor Bolsheviks. Born the son of a poor Orthodox priest, he was a cautious and bland man. Once he came to Moscow to attend university, he almost never left the city again. He inherited a university position from his history professor, the conservative and patriotic Soloviev, from whom he absorbed the notion that the history of the Muscovite state was that of 'the gatherer of Russian lands'. Like Kostomarov, Kliuchevskii tended towards populism, concentrating less on princes than on the common people. However, he was not influenced by western historians and he embraced no particular philosophy of history. Frugal, hard working, and solitary, he read little literature and neglected ideas in general including even Marxism.

An 1882 book on *The Boyar Council* made his reputation. He divided Russian history into four periods and linked them by 'the idea of the Russian land'. He seems not to have noticed that Russia had subsumed many nationalities. He largely ignored the influence of the Mongols on national development, took no account of Lithuanian history, and largely ignored the Russian expansion to Central Asia. He never wrote about the suppression of non-Russian languages or about quelling of national unrest in the empire's borderlands. Accordingly, he did not discuss Kostomarov's or other rival versions of the origins of Russia.

Kliuchevskii believed that all Russians should be Orthodox Christians, but he was critical of the low intellectual level of church

leaders. He argued that the Church was a civilizing influence until the seventeenth century, but believed that it had little influence on the rise of Muscovy or the abolition of serfdom. He admired Peter I whom he evaluated as an intelligent and ruthless man who sacrificed himself out of a sense of duty. And he was fascinated by Catherine II whom he lauded for 'regaining' Ukraine and Byelorussia and restoring Russia's 'natural frontiers'. His *Course of Russian History* ended with her reign.

Kliuchevskii was no liberal. In 1892, he blocked Paul Miliukov's proposal to earn a doctorate because he disapproved of his politics. Appointed to an advisory council on legislative reforms in 1905, he vigorously supported autocracy. Equivocal about the October Manifesto, he was hostile to the Duma.

An impressive amount of scholarship has gone into Byrne's work. He considers Kliuchevskii to have been a precursor of the Annales school of history and treats his analysis as a bridge between pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. Most important, Kliuchevskii helped to create a Russian national consciousness in the nineteenth century. His viewpoint was so compelling that, with official help, it dominated scholarship for over a century and is only now beginning to be subject to some revision.

The book is divided into four sections: 'The Beginnings', 'The Moscow University Professor', 'Explaining Russian History', and 'Trying to Create a Nation'. Each section is subdivided into chapters. The result is choppy, repetitive, and often confusing because the same themes and subjects pop up repeatedly to be discussed from different angles. The somewhat less than ideal organization aside, this biography is a welcome and important contribution to the scholarship of Russian history and historiography.

Elizabeth Haigh
St Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia

Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics; From Independence to Democracy*, London: C.R. Hurst, 1997; ISBN 1–85065–308–8; xvii + 227 pp.; £17.95

Thanos Veremis is today a leading figure in Greek scholarly life, thanks to his extensive writings on Greek political history and foreign relations. His contributions to the historiography of Modern Greece have included significant research monographs in the fields of military and economic history and Greek-Turkish relations. The

present monograph is the product of many years of research on the role of the military in Greek politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This study is not 'military history' in a narrow sense. It is rather a history of political and social change in Greece through the prism of the evolution of the officer corps, the gradual formation of their corporate ideology and their style of behaviour as a force in Greek politics. A methodological constant of the work is the author's systematic effort to integrate the narrative of the officers' behaviour into the broader fabric of the society around them. To this end his dialogue with the main interpretative approaches to the study of Greek society is continuous and imaginative. We thus get a panorama of Greek history from 1830 to 1995 which is factual, free of nebulous generalities and jargon and readily accessible to the reader.

Veremis draws on a wide array of sources including a host of personal archives of major military and political leaders as well as printed secondary sources and a broad bibliography on Greek history and military sociology. As such it is a very useful research tool for anyone interested in the subject. A chronology of Greek history since independence, a note on sources and a prosopography of principal characters complete the scholarly apparatus of the volume.

Two broader aspects of the work have been particularly appealing to this particular reader. One is the possibility of comparative analysis that is immanent in the author's reconstruction of the successive phases of the military's role in Greek politics. The pattern that emerges could readily lend itself to comparison with Spain for instance, another contemporary Mediterranean democracy with a long history of military interventions throughout the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century.

The second contribution of the book that I find particularly valuable is its treatment of Greek nationalism. Through the reconstruction of the military officers' changing values Veremis establishes convincingly, I think, the changing nature of Greek nationalism from the inclusive cultural nationalism of the nineteenth century to an exclusive and atavistic chauvinism, with strong overtones of racism, in the twentieth.

This is a significant analytical perspective in that it leads the student of Greek history to appreciate the historicity and dynamic nature of nationalism in Greek society rather than treat it as the almost metaphysical demon, whose sinister and ubiquitous presence in the hands of the anthropologists can explain anything — and nothing.

The monograph embodies Thanos Veremis' mature judgement after a long personal history of involvement in the study of Greek society and politics. His reading is sophisticated and reasonable, free from ideological and methodological preconceptions and thus refreshing and reassuring for everyone seriously concerned for the future of Greek historical scholarship.

Paschalis M. Kitromilides
University of Athens

Willie Thompson, *The Communist Movement Since 1945*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998; ISBN 0–631–19971–3; 262 pp. including maps; £13.99

This latest work from William Thompson is part of Blackwell's 'History of the Contemporary World' series covering many pertinent political themes from the Second World War onwards.

One gets the feeling that this is the type of book the author could write in his sleep; he was in the Communist Party of Great Britain for nearly thirty years and so this account is one of total familiarity with the nuances of the movement. It is approached chronologically and, within the chapters, thematically. It is stated that only published material and not archival research was used (5). There is also the noted influences of Westoby (*Communism Since World War II*, Brighton, 1981 and *The Evolution of Communism*, Oxford, 1989). The first thirty pages explain events up to 1945. One would have preferred it if the text had gone straight into the post-1945 situation, assuming that readers would have some cursory knowledge of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath.

The engaging aspects are the author's ability to embellish points and make pertinent and incisive evaluations of events and epochs in the communist bloc. This is evident especially in descriptions of the split with Tito, events in Yugoslavia and the opposition to authoritarian rule in many states during the 1950s. There is also a brief look at the situation of Communist parties in non-communist countries, a theme developed in the latter half of the book. It is when the period of 'Destalinisation' (Ch. 3) is recounted that we feel we are getting to grips with the reality of the eastern bloc regimes. Again there are a few pages of descriptive account before one gets into the main changes during the 1950s. The GDR and the horrendous Ulbright regime, the ludicrous theories of Lysenko, the Khrushchev reforms

and of course the Hungarian uprising all show the varied aspects of socialism in the East. The communist governments were still so strongly embedded and ruthless that they, with the exception of total breakdown in Budapest in September 1956, either cosmetically changed leadership, as in Poland where it was for the better, or adapted without too much change, as in the GDR. Although the respective governments in these countries may all seem unattractive and damnable, it is good that the apparent differences that existed within the Communist and Workers' parties are explained. Critical events in Asia are also accounted for, especially events in China and the disastrous economic policies of Mao Zedong. Mao's commitment and leadership abilities meant that he overrode the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and came back in strength with the Cultural Revolution, a phenomenon that relied, paradoxically, on mobilizing the masses for reforms in a way unequalled in other socialist countries in Europe.

It is the events of the 1960s through to the 1980s that are most engaging. After the explanation of the differences between the USSR and China over 'Peaceful Coexistence' (Ch. 4) one can see how the theory of world revolution was adapted by the Soviet leadership to relax tensions and move to a more gradualist expectation of change, mainly through a perceived economic superiority. Hence the developments among the western European Communist parties became more diverse and the politics more interesting, not least because of the proliferation of, most noticeably, Trotskyist groups in the West. Thompson sees 'Orthodox Communism' (Ch. 5) between 1963 and 1970 as an unattractive period and the 'Indian Summer' (Ch. 6) from 1970 to 1981 as a resurgent one. New successes were much more apparent in the 1970s but one would see the 1960s as a continually stable time for Soviet socialism and growing independence movements but for one event: Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was the socialist intentions of the Dubcek regime and the inevitable schism coming from the Soviet-inspired invasion that finally convinced many communists that other roads needed to be explored.

Despite getting into the mindset of the hierarchy, by concentrating on political leaders and a broad sweep of events, other areas are neglected. One might have expected a breakdown of each country and some narrative text as to its development. There is a severe lack of economic and social information which makes it hard for us to see the historical differences between the countries. This is important not least because of the nationalism that was used to good effect at the end of the 1980s. This may have been asking too much but the footnotes reiterate points, or give good anecdotal examples, when

one might have expected more figures. The final chapter describing the fall of communism is the least worthy as it is too brief.

I really felt that the author's *The Left in History* (London, 1997), while giving a much broader account as it covered the history of socialism, was more satisfying. One reason for this was that one could see more clearly the context of communist regimes historically, from the practising of scientific socialism until its physical demise. Here, in comparison, it is harder to ascertain their importance in a world context.

Neil Rafeek
Caledonian University

Stanley Henig, *The Uniting of Europe: From Discord to Concord*, London, Routledge, 1998; ISBN 0–415–13693–8 (pbk); 120pp.; £8.99
Gülnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945–91*, London, Macmillan Press; ISBN 0–333–69323–X (hbk); 232pp.; £45

The large amount of scholarly interest in the study of European integration has been further boosted in recent years by the evolution of the European Union since the end of the Cold War and the making of the landmark Maastricht Treaty of 1992. These two books make a noteworthy contribution to the vast array of literature on the subject. Both deal with the main determinants of European integration since 1945 and in each case there is a strong emphasis on the importance of external conditions in bonding together the west European states during the Cold War period. Both authors also reflect on the post-Cold War international system in Europe and in doing so raise questions about the current and future impetus towards further European integration.

Henig offers a valuable introductory guide to the history of European integration in the period 1945–96. No major aspect of the subject escapes scrutiny in this concise, penetrating study that links the historical context and process of integration in order to explain the evolution of the European Community and its metamorphosis into the European Union. The history of the European Community/ Union receives ample coverage with very few factual errors, though Pleven (25) is better known as the French Prime Minister in 1950. Treatment of the formal institutions and informal workings of the organization is well-balanced and informative. The lucid summary

of the main theories and concepts of European integration will be welcomed by students who are unfamiliar with the subject and who are occasionally overwhelmed by the densely packed, theory-laden opening sections of some introductory texts.

The substance of Henig's thesis is that the process of European integration has been conditioned by the external threats and challenges arising out of the wider international context. In particular, the origins of the European Community were most markedly influenced by the external threat posed by the 'hot' Cold War which, as it subsequently ossified in the form of a divided Europe, remained a key determinant of Community integration. This thesis is supported by a wide-ranging coverage of international relations and national politics. Some aspects of the subject, however, arguably deserve further consideration. Economic factors, in particular, occasionally receive limited attention. The section on the origins of the Schuman Plan, for example, tends to overlook the material interests that greatly concerned French policy-makers in the early postwar years. Similarly, the discussion of the Single Market initiative reveals little about the economic interests of the EEC states and the growing consciousness of the declining competitiveness of the European economies as compared with their major trade rivals. In view of the basic argument of this book, moreover, further examples of the impact of external pressures on the process of integration might have been cited, as in the case of American support for the EEC during its formative years in the 1950s and Washington's influential role in discouraging the British from attempting to sabotage the project. But these are minor quibbles about a study which for its quality of analysis should figure as compulsory, introductory reading for students of European integration.

European security co-operation in the period 1945–91 is the particular facet of European integration that receives detailed treatment in Aybet's monograph. Her argument about the key determinants in this field provides a more expansive and nuanced study of themes touched on by Henig. Her thesis is that European security co-operation in the Cold War period was largely shaped by the external dynamics of the Soviet threat and the superpower squeeze. The Soviet threat gave rise to a western security framework under American leadership which meant that European security and economic co-operation became two separate processes. The superpower squeeze prompted attempts to create a European third force between superpowers at least until the 1960s, after which Western European states were fearful of either abandonment by the United States in the face of the Soviet threat or of entrapment by American policies which did not always reflect their interests.

This well-argued, clearly structured study marshals a large body of evidence drawn from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. An introductory chapter on the theories of integration demonstrates the value of specific theories in tackling the subject matter. Particularly effective use is made of the distinction between conscious and unconscious integration, while regime theory is employed to account for the survival of security co-operation in the 1990s in the face of the waning influence of Cold War conditions. Each chapter thereafter focuses on a particular decade to illustrate certain themes: the origins of European integration in the 1940s and the emergence of the Cold War framework, the differentiation between European security co-operation and the wider process of European integration in the 1950s, the continuation of this model in the 1960s and the 1970s, the revival of the idea of Western Europe as a bloc between the superpowers in the 1980s, and the dynamics of post-Cold War Western European security co-operation in the 1990s.

Aybet covers much familiar ground especially in the early postwar period, but here as elsewhere in the book the treatment is sharply focused and illuminating. The detailed analysis of the architecture of European security and of the perceptions and security interests of national policymakers are some of the many strengths of the book. The pitfalls of generalization occasionally become apparent as, for example, when the issue of German rearmament is represented as the main concern underlying the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (41). The account of some developments, moreover, does not quite capture several of the elements at work. The origins of the European Political Co-operation process (126–7), for example, might have considered the extent to which the conduct of superpower relations in this period acted as a spur to the EEC states. Nevertheless, this study offers a convincing analysis based on sound judgement and detailed evidence with only a rare puzzling statement such as the reference to the General Assembly of the OEEC (59).

The closing sections of both books deal with the dynamics of European integration in the post-Cold War period. Henig stresses the external parameters that will condition the process of integration, while Aybet concludes that the maintenance of European security co-operation now rests on the workings of internal dynamics and that the external environment is more likely to threaten rather than reinforce such co-operation. Whether the external or internal dynamics of European integration in the foreseeable future are likely to have the same unifying effects as the Cold War is a matter of fine judgement, especially in view of the far more fluid conditions that characterize the post-Cold War European security environment. The

hitherto primarily economics driven European Union has long promised but singularly failed to acquire a substantive role and identity in the area of foreign and security policy. This part of the Union's current agenda, as Henig notes, continues to demonstrate the greatest divergence between rhetoric and reality.

David Gowland
University of Dundee

Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, Basic Books, 1997; xviii + 444pp; $30

The 'America' of the European imagination has always held a contradictory fascination. At once a powerful signifier of liberation from Old World constraints and a bleak vision of a crass materialist and homogenizing future, America's paradoxical meanings to Americans and Europeans alike have framed a complicated trans-Atlantic dialogue since the seventeenth century. Until World War II, the conversation between Europeans and Americans over what made each other distinctive enjoyed the convenience of an established distance. After 1945, however, the United States' rise to globalism and its assumed responsibility for the rejuvenation of a war-torn and world-weary Europe brought about a collapse of the boundaries that once kept Americans and Europeans apart. The Marshall Plan, the expansion of mass communications, the improvement of trans-Atlantic traffic in materials, people, and ideas, have all led to an intensification of American influence over European affairs. It is within this context of 'Americanization' that Richard Pells examines the character of this hegemonic influence.

Taking issue with the fears European intellectuals have projected about the ramifications of 'Americanization', Pells provides an account sensitive to what America enabled as well as disabled in terms of the postwar reorganization of European identity. Refreshingly, Pells is prepared to work within the given of American dominance over Western Europe's political and economic restructuring since 1945. And it is on this basis that he is able to advance a nuanced understanding of how American influence was rationalized and used by different sections of the Western European community to their own advantage. Key to a fuller appreciation of how and why 'Americanization' has had its limits, is the importance of cultural difference. The latter is not reduced to an essentialist and stereo-

typical opposition between oppressor and oppressed. While European intellectuals may have resorted to cliché's about what in today's parlance might be termed the 'dumbing-down' power of American culture, Pells takes care to resist reinforcing this image, even as he spends time explaining the rationale behind such a conception of postwar trans-Atlantic relations. For Pells, it is vital to understand the receivers of American influence not as 'dupes' before an homogenizing and irresistible culture industry committed to propagandistic aims. And this applies to Americans as well as Europeans. 'Americanization' has been as incomplete a project in the United States as it has been abroad.

Aside from its use as a term for cultural hegemony, the term 'Americanization' has become synonymous with the postwar forces of multinational corporate capitalism and globalization. Such forces have undermined the validity of national identity *per se*, as more of the world finds itself imbricated in a standardized general economy dependent on flows of capital and information that are no longer the domain of nation states. In a context such as this, defences of national difference have found themselves increasingly redundant as a way to resist what is understood to be an affiliate effect: namely, the homogenization of culture. What Pells highlights, however, is that for globalization to work, it must necessarily adapt to local environments — especially at the level of culture. While there may appear to be a political economy of sameness across Europe as a result of 'Americanization's' inroads, the legitimation of this political economy has come to depend, ironically, on an appeal to cultural difference and the evocation of heterogeneous identities. It took time for trans-Atlantic parties to understand that difference did not have to be understood as deficiency. Pells deals with the way different audiences received differently the ostensibly standardized mass products of Americanization, such as the movies, popular music, television, even EuroDisney. Far from being consumed vacuously, such popular cultural forces have always had to service local desires — or rather a local relationship to the problems of standardization and the status quo. And the latter is not necessarily to be equated with 'America'. For in certain instances American popular culture has serviced rebellion against staid elements of the European establishment, not in the name of 'Americanization,' but in the name of democratic improvement of European socio-political relations.

There is much to be praised in such an account. Pells could be open to criticism in providing an overly optimistic view of how difference has triumphed over homogeneity in the age of globalism. But his careful documentation of the incomplete nature of a whole

range of attempts to 'Americanize' Europe provides powerful and provocative evidence for his case. The failure of overt propaganda, and the ironic consequences of the more subtle attempts to 'Americanize' Europeans through intellectual exchanges and the foundation of the European American Studies movement reveal the degree to which the project of 'Americanization' facilitated not the levelling of distinctions between cultures — but better understanding of each party's relationship to the standardizing and modernizing features of first world life in the late twentieth century.

This said, there is room still for a clearer exegesis on the way 'Americanization' has become equated with 'modernization' (the interchangeability of the terms needs more careful reflection). The story of postwar Europe's apparent capitulation before the levelling power of modernization has been couched, however, in the more antiquated terms of struggles between national interests. While Pells reveals the shortcomings and ironies of using nationalist rhetoric to both promote and resist 'Americanization', he falls short of delivering a more emphatic statement about the significance of how the atavism of national identity has necessarily given way to other ways of understanding the relationship of the local to the global. How the latter might be the basis for a re-evaluation of what makes for counter-hegemony, and aid in the revision of our understanding of what constitutes political identity and struggle at this end of the twentieth century, remains unexplored.

Jonathan Munby
Lancaster University